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Abstract 
Networks have rapidly become the dominant trope in governance theory and practice. 
While scholarship highlights important benefits, there has been insufficient systematic 
interrogation of the potential pathologies in network governance. This paper addresses 
the lacuna. We begin by discussing different kinds of network analysis and 
distinguishing the specific claims of network governance theory.  We then pull 
together the scattered critically oriented literatures on the topic, identifying major 
problems with network modes of governance: hypocrisy, distrust, marketization, 
subjugation, anti-proceduralism, fragmentation, and ‘netsploitation’. We finally argue 
for a more agnostic approach to governance research, capable of taking account of 
these pathologies and thereby putting networks in their place.  This means avoiding 
the fetishization of particular modes of governance and giving more careful attention 
to the settings in which they each can be useful.  
Keywords: networks, hierarchy, market, governance, orthodoxy, critique.
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Introduction` 
Amidst the variety of governance mechanisms, one tends to become increasingly 
salient in specific historical conjunctures (Polanyi, 1944).  During the late 19th 
century, the market was the dominant mechanism through which social life was 
governed.  In the mid-20th century, the state and corporate hierarchies became far 
more prominent. During the last quarter of the 20th century there was, again, a notable 
return to celebrating markets as the most efficacious governance mechanism.  Over 
the past 20 years, however, networks have for the first time been deemed the most 
legitimate way of organizing social and political life. Today, it seems, networks are 
everywhere; in “military organisations, social movements, business formations, 
migration patterns, communication systems, physiological structures, linguistic 
relations, neural transmitters and even personal relationships” (Hardt and Negri, 2005: 
142).  This paper develops a critical assessment of what we see as excessive claims 
for the spread and efficacy of networks in the governance system.   
 
A network is basically “a set of nodes and the set of ties representing some 
relationship, or lack of relationship, between nodes” (Brass et al, 2004: 795).  Our 
target is not the idea of networks so-described, but the specific meanings accorded to 
them in contemporary governance theory, especially political science and public 
policy.  First, networks are purported to be beneficial because they provide a better 
‘fit’ with macro-environmental changes such as globalization, the restructuring of the 
state, individualization, and knowledge capitalism.  Second, these conditions are 
perceived to have led to the massive proliferation of networks (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2006: 59).  Third, the characteristic considered to distinguish network governance 
from other modes of coordination is that it is based on the ethical virtues of ‘trust’ 
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(Thompson, 2003), fostering more open, fluid and flexible forms of association.  
Finally, trust-based networks are considered by many to be the basis for better 
governance, avoiding the dead weight of bureaucracy as well as the fickleness of the 
market (Stoker, 2004).  By bringing citizens into the process of governing, networks 
are credited with having the potential to increase the legitimacy and responsiveness of 
governance mechanisms (ibid).  Their popularity throughout the spheres of 
government, business and civil society has even led some to argue that the network is 
now the “hegemonic” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 280) mode of governance, signifying 
the emergence of a new ‘orthodoxy’ (Marsh, 2011).  
 
In this paper, we do not deny that networking is an important mode of governance, 
possessing strengths and advantages. Our argument is rather that much of the existing 
literature provides an excessively one-sided perspective, accentuating the more 
positive and socially palatable aspects. Consequently, the pathological or problematic 
dimensions of network governance tend to be at best seen as an after-thought.  This 
tendency continues to fuel an unrealistic image of network governance, and a myopic 
understanding of practices of governance as a whole. Our central contribution is to 
address this lacuna and, in doing so, put networks in their place. We do so by 
exploring multiple pathologies of network governance and then suggesting an 
alternative approach that is far more agnostic towards the prevalence and virtues of 
networking.  To do this, we begin by sketching out the existing literature and 
highlighting the central benefits attributed to networks. We then proceed to explore 
the limitations of networks, arguing that they generate a variety of pathologies 
including hypocrisy, distrust, marketization, subjugation, anti-proceduralism, 
fragmentation, and ‘netsploitation’. Given these problems, the final part of the paper 
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explores how the analysis of network governance might be reconfigured. We argue 
for an agonistic approach, in which claims for networks are treated in a more 
circumspect way.  With a view to opening up debate, we begin to develop an 
alternative approach to theorising networks.  This rests on the intuition that we should 
stop according precedence to the network, recognizing it simply as a conventional 
mode of ‘governance as usual’  and delimiting situations in which it might be the 
most appropriate mechanism (Crouch, 2005).   Our premise is that hierarchies, 
markets and networks routinely combine in everyday governance processes and that 
we therefore need more dispassionate research about the prevalence and efficacy of 
networking for particular goals. We suggest that conceiving of hierarchies, markets 
and networks as building blocks – inputs as well as outputs – can contribute to a 
better assessment of strong, but contrasting claims for the proliferation and 
appropriateness of networks: that they make for better governance, are part of the 
hegemonic apparatus of neoliberalism, or are the best vehicle for insurgency and 
emancipation.  
 
The Development of Network Governance Theories 
The study of networks became intellectually fashionable in the 1980s, but it has a 
much longer history. It is also a many-headed beast with a distinguished lineage in the 
social sciences.  For example,  Borgatti et al (2009) charted the development of 
network analysis throughout the 20th century, citing sociometry in the 1930s as the 
precursor to the popular and influential technique of Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
today (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003).  The analytical premise of SNA is that ‘as social 
animals, people network and that our networking affects social outcomes’.   SNA 
‘makes no special claims for networking as ‘the good’ or as the emblem of social 
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change’ (Davies, 2011: 10).  It is rather adept at discovering patterned social relations, 
which protagonists may or may not describe in the language of ‘networks’.  Early 
SNA highlighted the role that networks play in shaping broader dynamics of social 
life (such as choice of marriage partners). Interestingly, it has also been used to 
challenge the premise of what Grote (2012) called the ‘horizontalist expectation’ in 
network governance theory. His study of networks in the European regions revealed 
that they were actually sustained hierarchically.  
 
It was only in the last 30 years that the concept of networks rose to prominence as a 
way of exploring governance in what is conventionally understood to be an 
increasingly ‘disorganized’ economy and society (Offe and Keane, 1985).  It became 
increasingly influential in theories of the changing dynamics and relationships that 
predominate in (post)modern capitalist societies (Castells, 1996).  Capturing the 
zeitgeist, Hardt and Negri argued that the network ‘has become a common form that 
tends to define our ways of understanding the world and acting in it.  (…) The 
tendency of this common form to emerge and exert its hegemony is what defines the 
period’ (2005: 142).   This is not altogether an exaggeration, as a vast body of theory 
has been incorporated into the networks milieu; from the theories of reflexive 
modernisation (Beck, 1992) and the information age (Castells, 1996) to the ‘strategic 
relational’ theory of Jessop (2007) who, while professing agnosticism, arguably errs 
towards the vocabulary of networks.   
 
With the backdrop of growing skepticism about theories of ‘imperative coordination’ 
by a command state, a significant body of researchers began exploring the importance 
of networks in the governance system.  The early collaborative work of Marsh and 
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Rhodes (1992) described policy networks as a structure of resource-dependent 
organizations.  If anything, the ‘resource dependency’ tradition was grist to the mill of 
elite theorists and Marxists, showing how the interdependence of state and non-state 
actors sustained and reinforced power asymmetries in important policy areas (see also 
Marsh, 2011 for reflections).  It therefore did much valuable work to highlight the 
role of networks as power structures (also Benson, 1977), and made no claims about 
the alleged proliferation of networks, the question of trust-based coordination, or their 
utility for ‘good government’. They saw In other words, this literature recognized that 
networks are a powerful organizing tool, but accorded them no special potential.    
 
Our target here is not, therefore, the techniques of network analysis or approaches that 
use them to show how power relations are produced and sustained across sectors. It is 
rather what we call network-boosterism; the tendency to attribute excessive analytical 
and normative weight to the role of networking in organizing and regulating 
relationships between governments, corporations and citizens.  
Following his ‘postmodernist’ turn, Rhodes (1997a) was perhaps the most prominent 
political scientist aligning himself with social-theoretical claims that networks are 
increasingly significant (e.g. Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994), even going so far as to 
conflate governance with networks – an elision he acknowledged in reflections on his 
career as editor of Public Administration (Rhodes, 2011: 198).   It is the additional 
significance attributed to networks in recent governance theory that we seek to 
contest.  These approaches are distinguished from earlier traditions of network 
analysis by four inter-related claims, made more or less forcefully by different 
scholars.   
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First network governance theory is rooted in prominent assumptions about social 
change in the post-war period.  Perhaps most notably, globalization is perceived to 
have undermined the command power of nation states – their capacity to govern 
either citizens or markets.  In this world, the ability to learn the arts of networking is 
increasingly essential for successful (meta) governance (Pedersen, Sehested and 
Sørensen, 2011).  In addition, after the late 1970s New Public Management reforms 
further dissipated state capacities creating additional coordination problems, for 
which networks were conceived as the best, albeit imperfect, solution (Rhodes, 
1997a).  In the late 1960s and 1970s, network theorists also began arguing that the 
emerging knowledge economy was creating unprecedented information flows, which 
could not be subordinated to command power.  Such flows could only be channeled 
through networks (Castells, 1996).   At the same time, processes of individualization 
were perceived to be gathering pace because of the irretrievable breakdown in the 
institutions, traditions and solidarities of modernity – e.g. family, unions, faith, gender 
relations and deference to hierarchy (Beck, 1992).  In societies with high levels of 
individualization and unfettered information flows, command strategies were deemed 
increasingly futile and networks as the most effective mechanism for coordination and 
regulation.   
 
The second prominent claim of network governance research is that in these 
conditions, there has been a vast quantitative increase in networking.  Bevir and 
Rhodes (2006: 59) summarized as follows: ‘Social scientists typically describe 
contemporary governance as consisting of something akin to a differentiated polity 
characterised by a hollowed-out state, a core executive fumbling to pull rubber levers 
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of control, and, most notably, a massive proliferation of networks’.  These are utilized 
to counter fragmentation and the control-deficits described above.  
 
Third, whereas command and competition are the primary regulative mechanisms in 
hierarchies and markets, networks are commonly distinguished by the degree of 
‘trust’ they engender (Thompson, 2003).  According to Frances et al (1991: 15), ‘[i]f 
it is price competition that is the central co-ordinating mechanism of the market and 
administrative orders that of hierarchy, then it is trust and co-operation that centrally 
articulates networks’.  The capacity of networks to realize the benefits of trust arises 
from the claim (e.g. Giddens, 1994: 192) that we now live in conditions of relative 
abundance, emerging concurrently with fragmentary processes of de-traditionalization 
(Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994: 195). For Giddens, post-scarcity emancipates the 
subject from the insularity he associated with the struggle for subsistence in all 
previous human societies, creating conditions in which more trusting relationships, 
and thus networks, can flourish.  The purported benefit of trust-based governance is 
that it avoids the heavy-handed bureaucratic rules of the state as well as vagaries of 
the price setting mechanisms associated with the market (Powell, 1990).  The 
potential for networks based on trust is therefore regarded as crucial for resolving the 
governance challenges associated with de-traditionalization and individualization 
(Bauman, 2002: xvi).  As Davies (2012: 2690) argued moreover, the degree of trust in 
any process is ‘a good benchmark of its efficacy for network governance’.  
Conversely, if the distinguishing characteristic of trust is lacking or in short supply, it 
is difficult to sustain claims for the proliferation of networking.    
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Finally, there has been considerable investment in the alleged social benefits of 
cultivating networks based on trust. Thompson (2003: 40), for example, argued that 
networks depend on ‘ethical virtues: ‘co-existent attributes such as sympathy, 
customary reciprocity, moral norms, common experience, trust, duty, obligation and 
similar virtues’ of the kind that Giddens associated with post-scarcity.   Gilchrist’s 
study of community empowerment exemplifies the normative commitment to network 
governance.  She concluded (2009: 175):  
In a world characterized by uncertainty and diversity, the networking approach 
enables people to make links, to share resources and to learn from each other 
without the costs and constraints of formal organizational structures.  
Empowerment is a collective process, achieved through compassion, 
communication and connections.   
These purported qualities make networks highly adaptive and able to innovate, shift 
and change. They are liable to form and dissolve, bringing together a fluid plurality of 
interests in pursuit of goals that are also likely to be in constant flux.  In other words, 
while they can anchor cooperation, they are also better able to adapt to the fast-
changing preferences of those constituting them, than clunky command or 
instrumental contract relationships.  
 
In sum, there has been a powerful tendency in the contemporary governance literature 
to represent networks as both newly significant and value-adding mechanisms. This 
tendency rests on three common assumptions: network governance proliferated 
massively in the changing social and economic conditions of the late 20th and early 
21st centuries; networks are based on and can cultivate trust; and they are uniquely 
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adaptive, making them more effective for governing complex societies than other 
devices.  They represent an attractive alternative to the command and contract modes 
of coordination because they fit with increasingly fragmented societies and provide 
more flexible and fluid co-ordination.  These benefits have been widely articulated 
within the literature, and we do not by any means dismiss them.  However, there has 
been far less reflection on the potential pathologies of networks in the governance 
literature. It is to this lacuna that we now turn.  
The Pathologies of Network Governance 
The rise of networks has not been uncontested.  Many theorists are more or less 
sceptical towards claims for a radical transformation from more traditional 
bureaucratic mechanisms of co-ordination towards networks (e.g. Davies, 2011; 
Marsh, 2011; Stoker, 2011).   Issues discussed in the critical literatures include the 
insipid pluralism and ignorance of social structures characteristic of the ‘orthodoxy’ 
(Marsh, 2011), the inability of network theories to explain change (Richardson, 2000) 
and the tendency to exaggerate de-traditionalization (Callinicos, 2007).  At a higher 
level of abstraction, the foundations of network theory have been critiqued by 
scholars such as Atkinson (2007) and Callinicos (2007), who argue that the 
phenomena Beck, Giddens and others interpret as signs of reflexive modernization, 
are conjunctural, contingent and reversible.  Here, however, we focus specifically on 
the pathologies of networks as a governing mechanism. 
 
Networks-scepticism has tended to be discussed in a fragmentary way, and in the 
following paragraphs we draw together the heterogeneous strands.  We argue that 
taken together, they point to serious pathologies in network governance. We identify 
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seven: hypocrisy, distrust, marketization, subjugation, anti-proceduralism, 
fragmentation, and ‘netsploitation’. We consider each of these charges in turn.  
Hypocrisy  
The first problem with celebrations of network governance is that they are frequently 
based on hypocrisy. By this we mean that there is a frequently a gulf between rhetoric 
and practice (Brunsson, 1989). For example, many networks are only such in name.  
That is, they are often ‘organized’, created by some official body (such as national 
government, a corporation, or a local council). Research on these bodies rarely finds 
the characteristics purported to distinguish networks from other modes of governing, 
such as high levels of trust (e.g. Guarneros, 2008). There are two prominent facets of 
this critique.   
  
First, networks are represented as mechanisms that both enable governing resources 
to be coordinated in a fragmented polity and enable participating citizens to influence 
elites in face-to-face dialogue.  However, it is well established that they tend to 
privilege the interests of powerful state and market actors to the detriment of subaltern 
groups (Davies, 2007). For example, in addition to problems of legitimacy associated 
with the disconnect from democratic processes (Mathur, Skelcher and Smith, 2005), 
the governing network commonly excludes organized labour and other potential 
malcontents.    
 
Furthermore, organized governing networks are often very bureaucratic and prone to 
perpetuating exclusions.  Davies’s (2007) study of the micro-dynamics of state-led 
partnerships in Dundee and Hull provided a glimpse of how these mechanisms can 
undermine networking.  First, he found a centralizing dynamic, where state managers 
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sought to structure out dissent and debate in the interests of efficiency in delivering 
government policy.  Second, he found value conflicts between public officials and 
citizen activists and that these conflicts were closed to conscious deliberation.  
‘Partners’ displayed ‘mutual incomprehension’ despite sharing a common vocabulary 
of goals, such as ‘social inclusion’. This lack of mutual understanding contributed to 
explaining why government officials sought to control the collaborative process and 
access to it.  In addition, where governing networks begin with a degree of openness 
to a plurality of political perspectives, there is evidence of a trend towards ‘closure’, 
such as in the ‘flagship’ New Labour regeneration programme, New Deal for 
Communities.  According to Lawless, ‘the original assumption that partnerships 
should be given a strong degree of local flexibility and freedoms has been steadily 
eroded’ (2004: 383).   
 
A similar story emerges in a study of networks in the healthcare sector. Researchers 
examined a range of clinical networks between healthcare providers and research 
institutions in response to a government initiative (Addicott et al, 2007). They found 
the network was largely a paper-based phenomenon.  Members of the network 
continued to relate in a way which was heavily shaped by aspects of the traditional 
professional hierarchy found in the medical community. In this case, it appears, the 
network model was largely used to build legitimacy with the government and extract 
resources, rather than to transform relationships.  Beneath the rhetoric of connectivity, 
participants continued focusing on their organizations, much as before. 
 
In sum, while the discourse of network governance may sound appealing, a range of 
careful empirical studies have demonstrated there is often a significant disconnect 
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between rhetoric and reality. The idea that the discourse of networks obscures or 
legitimizes hierarchical practices now has widespread international currency (e.g. 
Guarneros, 2008). It suggests that far from representing a radical departure from 
bureaucratic modes of governance, networks may often be a form of window dressing 
designed to make them look more legitimate, attractive and up to date.  This strand of 
the critique anchors our agnosticism towards the claim that network governance is 
necessarily proliferating, discussed further below.  
Distrust 
A second potential pathology is that networking may actually breed distrust.  If levels 
of trust in society are low and declining, as Cook, Hardin and Levy (2007) suggested 
in a comprehensive study, it poses a challenge of logic to the notion that networks are 
proliferating and capable of fostering cohesion.  For example, despite New Labour’s 
enthusiasm for networks, Stoker (2002: 432) argued that its governing strategy was 
infused not by trust, but fatalism, ‘a widespread but not universal culture of paranoia 
that sees enemies all around’.  More recently, the Demos ‘Progressive Conservatism 
Project’ found that front-line staff in the public sector were trapped in a ‘vicious 
circle’ of falling status and low morale, are treated like ‘untrustworthy teenagers’ and 
experience a ‘crippling’ lack of trust from middle management and Whitehall.1    
Stoker (1998: 22-3) saw the journey to self-governing networks, the ‘ultimate’ 
partnership activity, as contingent in the first instance on governmental incentives.  
The problem this perspective poses is that instead of superseding them, networks 
appear to be rooted in hierarchies (also Grote, 2012).  Moreover, as Guarneros-Meza 
(2008: 1035) put it, state-organized governing networks can generate ‘no trust’.   If 
                                                        
1
 http://www.guardianpublic.co.uk/frontline-staff-bureaucracy. Accessed 7th 
September 2012. 
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trust is the distinguishing characteristic of network governance, but actually existing 
networks are often characterized by distrust, the obvious conclusion is that they must 
be sustained by other mechanisms such as command, resource dependency and 
instrumental cooperation.   
Marketization 
The mismatch between the rhetoric and practice of networks points towards a third 
major pathology: they are used as a front for the extension of marketization of social 
life, rather than as an alternative. Orthodox accounts of network governance argue, 
like Frances et al, that they are neither markets nor hierarchies (Powell, 1990).  
However, a number of studies find that the cultivation of network mechanisms has 
driven the extension of market relationships. Moran (2010: 34), for example, pointed 
to affinities between the perceived virtues of ‘light touch’ regulation in network 
theory and the small-state ideologies of neoliberalism.  The cultivation of networks 
has also been associated with the growing involvement of corporations in decision-
making, for example on various partnership boards. While in the past governance 
actors were assumed to play the role of deciding in the broad public interest, 
representatives from business are expected only to promote their own interests and 
positions (to act as ‘representatives of business’), which in the dominant political 
culture are conflated with the interests of society as a whole.  The result is that they 
often act as the collaborative face of cold and calculating growth strategies (Alonso, 
2001).   
 
This point can be extended by considering the significance of Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s (2006) New Spirit of Capitalism, who explore the celebration of networks 
by corporate managers.  Boltanski and Chiapello’s point of departure is that 
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corporations succeeded in appropriating the ‘artistic’ dimension of the critique, which 
inspired many of the social movements during the late 1960s.  In place of the 
moribund Fordist system, they argue, capitalism reinvented itself, producing a new 
‘connectionist’ or networked paradigm centred on the knowledge economy.  Whereas 
Fordism was all about routine, repetition and standardization, the knowledge 
economy relies on creativity, adaptability, communication and the art of connecting 
laterally in project-based teams built on trust.  This appeal to networks was vital in 
legitimizing the global capitalist renaissance preceding the crash in 2008, which was 
imbued with the ‘connectionist’ spirit described by Boltanksi and Chiapello. If 
capitalism is capable of generating and sustaining inclusive and affective network-
based associations and innovations, then there is nothing to fear from the roll-forward 
of markets.  From this perspective, networks actually drive marketization rather than 
offering an alternative.  Like ‘hypocrisy’ and ‘distrust’, this dimension of our critique 
suggests scepticism towards the proliferation and efficacy of networks.   
Subjugation  
A fourth major pathology of network governance is that it can cultivate subjugation. 
By this we mean the pervasive discourse of network-based governance prescribes a 
particular form of selfhood that should be occupied and displayed by users of that 
discourse. This is captured by Foucauldian approaches, which cast light on how new 
subjectivities, rationalities and rules for the ‘conduct of conduct’ emerge through 
networks. This work posits a shift from a society based on disciplinary technologies 
to those based on bio-political regulation or self-control (Bang, 2011).   They contend, 
somewhat pessimistically, that these governmentalities render actors complicit their 
own subjection.   
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Neoliberal regimes and their intellectuals have been remarkably candid about using 
acculturation strategies to counter de-traditionalization, without obvious concern for 
democratic legitimacy.  According to Bentley and Halpern (2003: 75), for example, 
the conjuncture demanded ‘serious changes in people’s everyday behaviour. (…) The 
success of progressive politics relies even more on creating a sense of shared 
responsibility to motivate certain kinds of behaviour and to generate causes and 
identities with which people are willing to engage’.  For Messner (1997), it is not 
‘only institutional structures and organisations but also systems of social values and 
action orientations that will have to be cultivated, modernized and advanced’, what 
some call ‘culture governance’ (cited in Newman, 2004: 80) or alternatively 
‘responsibilization’ (Clarke, 2005).   
Governing networks potentially play a very important role in subjugation.  Taking 
part in a state-led ‘partnership’ entails, at least tacitly, acknowledging fellow 
interlocutors as ‘partners’ rather than, say, ‘adversaries’.  One notable consequence of 
recognizing the interlocutor as a ‘partner’ is that working class activists, otherwise 
written out of history, reappear in the guise of déclassé ‘community representatives’. 
In this role, they are accorded largely symbolic rights of representation in return for 
activism mobilized in pursuit of a ‘shared’ governing agenda.  As Dean (2002: 171) 
argued, because it ‘posits in advance a unified community’, the legitimating function 
of networks ‘withdraws the revolutionary energy long associated with claims to 
universality’.  While it remains an open question how far networks successfully 
nurture governmentalities, the Foucauldian account highlights the dark side of the 
trust-based relationships celebrated in the orthodoxy: trust is not axiomatically good 
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and ‘distrust’ is a ‘very healthy fact of our condition’ (Cook, Hardin and Levy, 2007: 
60).   
 Anti-Proceduralism   
Networks can also destroy aspects of governance vital to ensuring fair and rational 
procedures. As we have seen, the basis of many accounts is the attempt to do away 
with formal and rule-bound governance embodied in Weberian principles of 
bureaucracy. Indeed, Stoker (2004) celebrated the potential of networks to replace 
bureaucratic proceduralism and rationality with what he sees as the re-politicization of 
governance.  While this may sound like an attractive prospect, some have sounded 
stringent warnings.  Rhodes warned that ‘accountability disappears in the interstices 
of the webs of institutions that make up governance’ (2000: 77).  Others point out that 
network-based systems of governance can lead to problems of diffuse or non-existent 
responsibility for decisions (Bogason and Musso, 2006).  While these criticisms 
represent such problems as soluble, or at least manageable, such as through 
democratic anchorage or metagovernance (e.g. Sørensen and Torfing, 2009), others 
are far less sure.  
 
In his defence of bureaucracy and rational proceduralism, Paul Du Gay (2000) 
illustrated how transparent, formal and rational structures that support equity and 
create space for deliberation are fundamentally threatened by network governance. He 
argued that some of the central problems arise from the decline of formal procedures 
and the cultivation of an ethos of enthusiasm and interest within governance 
arrangements. This means that instead of making impartial judgments, public officials 
are corralled into emotive passions and sectional interests. The result, Du Gay warns, 
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is that governance becomes increasingly dominated by officials acting without the 
constraints of measured deliberation and accountability. This means already dominant 
groups can push their own interests even further without having to negotiate the 
checks and balances that, in Weberian analysis, were so important to the functioning 
of modern government. Elites are able to consolidate their power with little reference 
to any other mechanism but ‘trust’ between them and other elite actors.   
 
In addition, Du Gay argues that that encouraging governance mechanisms based on 
managerial enthusiasm can be dangerous if there is conflict between groups with 
different goals. Reliance on informal mechanisms, such as trust, means that networks 
are unable to mediate conflicts, leading to often questionable and problematic 
outcomes.  Unable to cope with conflict, network actors retreat to a de-politicized 
discourse of conflict avoidance, what Laclau and Mouffe (2001: xv) called the 
‘sacralization of consensus’, which only serves to institutionalize power inequalities.   
Devoid of procedural checks and balances, asymmetric power within networks risks 
compounding the problem.  Hidden from democratic scrutiny, what passes for benign 
mutualism under a network lens may disguise exploitative relations.  Although 
Weberian bureaucracy is vulnerable to powerful criticisms, Du Gay’s defence 
highlights that an all too rapid embrace of networks can lead to managerial partiality 
and the increased influence of special interest groups.  
Fragmentation 
A further potential pathology of networks is that they can foster social fragmentation 
by undermining solidarity. One particularly interesting tension in network theories is 
between the claims respectively that networks foster long term ‘embedded’ 
relationships (Podolny and Page, 1998), or that they adapt and change given different 
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circumstances (Piore and Sable, 1984; Castells, 1996). Usually this paradox is 
resolved through the claim that embedded social relationships create trust, which 
allows networks to adapt without endlessly dissolving and forming anew. The 
mechanisms which bring people together, while allowing this flexibility and 
adaptability, are generally informal, restricting access to the community, macro-
cultures, collective sanctions and reputation (Jones et al, 1997).   
 
Again, this proposition might appear attractive, but it also comes with significant 
problems. Perhaps the most important is that the kinds of deeply embedded networks 
and relationships celebrated by proponents rarely match the fickle and opportunistic 
‘network building’ which takes place in their name. What network based governance 
often means in practice is a set of actors with more or less congruent goals coming 
together momentarily and being bound by nothing more enduring than a limited set of 
social pleasantries.  In his critique of the ‘fluid modernity’, Bauman (2003) points out 
that longer-term social relations overlaid with a deep sense of meaning, are frequently 
destroyed by transient networks.  
 
He highlights two disastrous outcomes. The first is that as deracinated individuals are 
compelled to participate in networks, they become increasingly used to treating 
networking opportunities in an instrumental and cold fashion. Building a network is a 
form of labour and human relationships become the focus for this work. They are 
something to be carefully managed. While this may seem sensible in a network age, 
Bauman argues that it results in us manipulating relationships strategically (also 
Illouz, 2007). No longer is the relationship based on enduring social bonds providing 
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a sense of conviviality and commitment. Instead, it becomes a conduit for useful 
information, resources and favours.  
 
This gives rise to a second problem –the network ‘logic of flows’ makes it very 
difficult, indeed sometimes impossible, to sustain social relations over time. The 
result is a notable lack of commitment and attachment to longer-term relationships 
and identities that were typically associated with collective identities, such as class or 
nation. Instead, people adopt temporary affiliations that change rapidly on the shifting 
sands of social life. Indeed, some have argued that the possibility of solidifying these 
relations into anything that implies long-term commitment has been eroded (Beck, 
1992: 101). The lack of formal binds, together with the purported desire of networkers 
to keep moving in pursuit of changing goals, means that many networks are unstable 
and often fleeting. One of the great tragedies of this, Bauman argues, is that social 
relations come to be seen as eternally temporary and effectively evacuated of 
meaning.  If network governance is only a temporary achievement (which many 
networks are), then it becomes difficult, if not impossible to invest it with the 
meaning and depth of experience that is usually associated with a governing 
institution. All the network provides is a thin set of relations and a promise of 
constant and repeated change, leaving people with a yearning for more enduring 
forms of mutualism coupled with an instrumental attitude towards standing 
commitments.    
 
Bauman’s insights are a clue as to why state-organized networks maybe prone to 
hypocrisy, morphing into hierarchies as corporations and governments try to impose 
order on the chaos unleashed by neoliberalization.  The upshot maybe, as suggested 
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earlier, that it is very difficult to sustain and stabilize networks without recourse to the 
mechanisms they are meant to supplant.  The central point against the orthodoxy is 
that rather than necessarily being the basis for affective and trust-based relationships, 
networks can actively undermine them.  
‘Netsploitation’ 
A final pathology is the new patterns of exploitation networks give rise to. Boltanski 
and Chiapello (2006) call these forms of ‘netsploitation’.  As we have already pointed 
out, they argue that the so-called ‘project-oriented justificatory regime’ is 
distinguished by the connectionist ‘spirit’ of our time. For them, social discourse 
establishes the image of a connected world, where networks and networking are all 
important. The worthy person is one who is ceaselessly able to establish social 
connections and networks through being consistently reflexive, mobile and engaged 
(2006: 127).  They then go on to point out that one of the major questions about this 
regime is who gets access to networks and who does not? Indeed, we have already 
highlighted that networks can cement and increase the power of states and 
corporations.  Through simultaneous connection to broader networks, the successful 
connectionist may enjoy the external benefits of these activities (by putting their name 
to and enjoying certain reputational capital), often without running the risk of 
investing in the work or taking responsibility for it. Thus exploitation comes from the 
differential capabilities of those who are able to maintain mobility and the capacity to 
connect and those who cannot.    
 
While Boltanski and Chiapello are concerned largely about exploitation within the 
labour market, the lessons are highly salient for other spheres.  In particular, 
governance networks often involve powerful bodies (such as central state agencies) 
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building connections around smaller organizations, such as NGOs, that were already 
doing the tasks a network claims before it was actually formed. By establishing a 
network, the central node is then able to take much of the credit for work that was 
already occurring. Moreover, when claiming credit, they do not have to make serious 
or enduring commitments to other actors.  The current UK government 
simultaneously demanding greater voluntary action and cutting voluntary sector 
budgets is arguably a good case of a nodal broker ‘moving on’ when the political and 
financial weather makes it expedient (Davies and Pill, 2012). In other words the 
central node is able to exploit much of the value created by other organizations. When 
benefits no longer flow, it is able to move swiftly on, sometimes destroying the 
network in its wake.  Financial movements exemplify, precipitating what Harvey 
(1978) called ‘switching crises’, as capital abandons spaces mined of their profit 
potential for new markets.    
Discussion: Putting Networks in their Place 
In short, networks maybe a valid, if limited, response to de-traditionalization  but they 
do not resolve, and may aggravate, enduring power asymmetries.  Far from being 
subject to minor problems, our critique suggests that network governance is linked 
with a number of serious and far-reaching pathologies.  It begs the question of what 
responses to the networks orthodoxy might be appropriate.  In this discussion, we 
look at three broad responses: disposing of networks, radicalizing them and a more 
agnostic approach that seeks to put networks in their place alongside other modes of 
governance. We argue that the third option holds out the greatest potential as a way of 
addressing the pathologies of networks without exaggerating them.  
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One potential response involves disposing with the vocabulary of networks, based on 
the intuition that they are irredeemably problematic. This approach seeks to cast off 
not just the language, but also the broader social discourse associated with networks. 
Proponents typically seek to replace the notions of network based governance with an 
alternative vocabulary recovered from previous political struggles.  For instance, 
Davies’s Gramscian approach argues that the networks movement should be 
understood as a key element in the hegemonic projects of neoliberalism – what he 
calls its ‘visionary regulative ideal’ (2012: 2688).  Boltanski and Chiapello (2006) 
suggested that an alternative language of social and economics rights and solidarity 
may serve as a meaningful alternative to network forms of governance. As was 
commented earlier, Paul du Gay (2000) continues to make a compelling case for 
rational bureaucratic proceduralism as an alternative to network governance.  
 
What we think is crucial here is not the specific lexicon of governance offered by any 
particular author. Rather, it is the idea that notions of networks should be vigorously 
questioned and resisted. While such approaches represent an important note of 
scepticism, they also tend to assume that the vision of network based governance is 
dangerous and has no place in the contemporary lexicon of governance. This can have 
the effect of ignoring both the undoubted acuity of traditional approaches to network 
research, as well as the potential benefits of networking in particular situations.     
  
A contrasting reaction is to ‘radicalize’ networks. Proponents of this position argue 
that the central problem with contemporary approaches is that they do not go far 
enough.  The paradigm example of this perspective is the proliferation of 
‘horizonalist’ social movements in response to the global economic crisis – such as 
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Occupy Wall Street (Mason, 2012).  Their intuition is that it is therefore necessary to 
replace ‘fake’ governmentalized institutions with radically (de)structured networks 
that are more authentically egalitarian.  For them, networks are entities that overflow 
attempts to control them and involve ceaseless and unending connections (Hardt and 
Negri, 2005).   However, for reasons explained in the preceding critique, we see no 
reason to think that social movements are less vulnerable to the seven pathologies 
than state-led governance mechanisms.    
 
To summarise; we believe that disposing of networks is wrong - the reverse error of 
excessive enthusiasm.  We agree that networks may have many benefits for different 
social groups and as governing technologies.  But at the same time, in a power-laden 
society radicalizing the approach in the manner of Occupy would not itself overcome 
the pathologies.  We suggest that when there is an excessive emphasis on networks as 
the only appropriate form of governance we risk falling into ‘network 
fundamentalism’. This involves wilful blindness towards alternative forms of 
governance. It also entails an excessive attachment to network forms – often in the 
face of the pathologies produced by that very form.  
 
We therefore conclude by suggesting a much more agnostic and measured approach.  
Challenging the excesses of both network fundamentalists, and network rejectionists 
involves recognizing that governance is multi-modal and that network-based forms of 
governance maybe appropriate in particular settings, and only when they are 
buttressed by other modes of governance.  The starting point suggested by our 
critique is the intuition that concrete governing processes synthesize different 
elements of hierarchies and markets as well as networking.  When Rhodes (1997b) 
Page 25 of 37 
 
argued that it was the ‘mix that matters’, he had in mind that networks were arising 
alongside, and perhaps displacing, other modes of governance. Subsequently, there 
has arguably been a tendency to essentialize governance processes by categorizing 
them as either one thing or the other – such as by subsuming state-business-civil 
society partnerships to the category of networks.   We suggest that in reality, 
governance processes are constituted from all three: fluid, variable and evolving 
configurations of simultaneously hierarchy, market and network.  Many of the studies 
we discussed earlier highlight the uneasy synthesis and evolving configurations of 
trust, command and contract relationships within institutions labelled ‘network’.  
Moreover, Grote’s (2012) study found not only that relations typically described in 
the vocabulary of networks were organized hierarchically but also that simplistic 
characterizations such as hierarchy = command, market = contract, networks = trust, 
were misleading. He demonstrated that markets can just as well be based on 
command, networks on competition and hierarchies on trust.   
 
The analytical implication is that we should abandon simplistic formulae for integral 
and inductive analysis – a more sensitive approach to revealing the different 
configurations in play and their trajectories in governance mechanisms of all kinds.  
We describe this approach as agnostic and inductive.  The crucial feature is that it 
represents hierarchy, market and network as ‘inputs’ or building blocks rather than 
‘outcomes’ or ‘types’ of institution.  Conceiving of governance in this way has 
considerable potential for assessing the vast array of claims for and against networks.  
It by no means rules out the possibility that certain governance practices are indeed 
network-intensive.  For example, Issett et al (2011: i166) highlight how informal 
networks tend to connect actors with strong cultural and interest-based affinities, 
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excluding others in order to avoid conflict.  Networks of this kind, based on the 
congruence of goals, can generate high levels of inter-personal trust, as the literature 
on policy communities highlighted (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992).  Trust-based practices 
of this kind have the benefit of providing stability and continuity, but are also liable to 
replicating the power asymmetries discussed in our critique.   
 
Questions for research might therefore be how far the rise of the ideology of networks 
is a rhetorical sleight of hand that obscures historic continuities in power relations and 
governing strategies – an instance of what Du Gay (2003) called ‘epochalism’?  To 
what extent, following Davies (2011), does networking serve a hegemonic function, 
seeking to strengthen the integration of state and civil society, holding out the 
prospects of a flexible mutualism within the neoliberal project?  Or, does 
neoliberalism both promote and undermine networking (Bang, 2011)?  Are trust-
based networks predominantly exclusive, or is diversity compatible with cultivating 
additional trust?  Equally, our agnostic approach poses questions of committed social 
movement “horizontalists” (Mason, 2012: 45).  To what extent do they cultivate 
‘genuine’ networks constituting Deleuzian ‘zones of intensity’ and creating enduring 
connections between different social formations (Chesters and Welsh, 2006: 196)?  
Do they really overflow and outflank the coercive and disciplinary modalities of 
neoliberalism or become recuperated?   Ultimately, what kinds of processes are most 
conducive to high levels of trust-based networking, and how do configurations of 
hierarchy-market-network evolve over time? 
 
To develop a more agnostic and inductive approach finally entails revisiting the 
question of ‘appropriateness’.  Crouch (2005, 2011) maintained that good governance 
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has always required a mixture of different mechanisms, including hierarchies markets 
and networks. This is both for reasons of resilience (if one mechanism fails then 
others will take its place) and access (different governance mechanisms guarantee 
different actors access). Thus, networks maybe appropriate for some aspects of social 
life, but not others.  For example, civil society groups maybe better placed than 
governmental agencies to organize and coordinate themselves through networks and, 
in doing so correct or balance the instrumental and oppressive practices of states and 
corporations (Crouch, 2011).  Studies influenced by Habermasian discourse ethics 
suggest that networks can create a space between state and market in which 
deliberative politics can flourish. By doing so, they may extend the public sphere, 
empowering communities and forging spaces for inclusive policy making (Fung and 
Wright, 2001: 25).  In a Habermasian interpretation, networking is prone to 
recuperation – the ‘colonization’ of the lifeworld - and thus it is most likely to flourish 
behind ‘restraining barriers’ erected within civil society.  However, it is important not 
to treat civil society as an undifferentiated or progressive totality either.  Like social 
movements, other forms of civil society network maybe prone to the pathologies 
discussed earlier.  
 
The actual and appropriate balance of networking and other regulative mechanisms is 
therefore a contextual question, depending on the goals in question.  When it is 
pushed too far and applied in inappropriate situations, we have seen that a range of 
serious problems begin to appear. Fragile and informal relations begin to take the 
place of more sturdy and established bases for social relations such as rules and laws.  
Normatively, as well as analytically, it is important to assess both the strengths and 
limitations of networking in relation to particular social contexts and problems.   
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Conclusion 
In this paper we have questioned Castell’s (1996) claim that the ‘network logic’ now 
dominates social life.  Instead of joining celebrations of network governance, we 
instead hold it up to critical scrutiny and ask vital questions about the nature, viability 
and desirability of network practices.   Our analysis makes clear that while networks 
are important, they create a range of significant problems.  For us, these pathologies 
are deep-seated and cannot be solved with a few tweaks.  However, instead of 
committing the opposite error of rejecting networks, we suggest a cautious, 
circumspect and agnostic approach. This involves putting networks in their place and 
conceiving them as part of a broader range of modes of governance. Simply, networks 
are likely to involve elements of hierarchy and contract, while hierarchies are likely to 
involve elements of both contract and networking.  Our agnostic approach encourages 
us to both reconsider the appropriateness of networks in different contexts and assess 
continuity and change in real-world governance processes of many different kinds. It 
provides a way of avoiding both the liberating and oppressive potentialities in 
networks, while recognizing that command and contract relationships remain integral 
to everyday practice.    
 
The strategy proposed in this paper is by no means the only way the debate can be 
opened up.  Rather, we hope it is a thought-provoking starting point for a 
thoroughgoing rethink of dominant understandings of network governance, a rethink 
that contemporary scholarship increasingly demands.  Our challenge does not mean 
we think network governance cannot flourish and be beneficial in some 
circumstances, or that theories of network governance are devoid of insight.  On the 
contrary, if proponents tend to fetishize the network it is important that we learn 
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lessons and do not fetishize the critique. All we are attempting to do is to open up the 
space for a critique capable of better understanding the nature and efficacy of 
networking in contemporary governance.  
 
We also hope to open new avenues for research. One possibility is to consider more 
systematically and empirically the conditions in which the problems we identify 
actually occur. This question can be answered through cross-sectoral comparison of 
different kinds of networks. A second avenue might be to bring together alternatives 
to network analysis, developing detailed cases and models of how, when and where 
each has the greatest purchase. A third avenue would involve sketching out criteria 
which provide a good sense of when governing arrangements might usefully be built 
on networks and when not, drawing inspiration from the tempered approach 
developed by Crouch and others.  The final and we think most pressing challenge is to 
begin developing a broader lexicon of theoretical concepts with which to think about 
human association and governance beyond the orthodoxies of past and present.  We 
hope this paper suggests some fruitful avenues for colleagues to pursue. 
 
________________________________ 
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